Observers of the Indonesian 2024 presidential race not too long ago witnessed a stunning flip of occasions. After a interval of relative silence on the matter, presidential hopeful Anies Baswedan lastly declared his alternative of operating mate. To the astonishment of many, it was none aside from Muhaimin Iskandar, the chairman of Nationwide Awakening Get together (PKB), a member of the coalition of events that had till that time supported Prabowo Subianto’s presidential bid.
The sudden political marriage of Anies and Muhaimin—brokered by Nasdem Get together chairman Surya Paloh—sparked outrage inside Anies’ personal coalition. The Demokrat Get together—whose chairman, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, had been seen because the strongest candidate for Anies’ operating mate, instantly declared their departure from the coalition. Demokrat grassroot cadres expressed their dissatisfaction by dismantling celebration’s banners and marketing campaign supplies and deleting postings on social media that includes Anies. Even the Affluent Justice Get together (PKS), one other member of Anies’ political coalition, was deliberately absent in the course of the declaration of the Anies–Muhaimin ticket, in addition to the primary post-declaration coalition meeting, implying their dissatisfaction.
The rise of Muhaimin to the forefront of presidential race fuelled dissent not solely among the many competing coalition of events, but in addition internally inside Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Islamic mass organisation PKB is carefully related to. As the most important Muslim organisation in Indonesia, the votes of NU grassroots followers—or nahdliyin—have at all times been extremely prized, and even thought of a decisive think about securing victory in presidential elections. Since Indonesia’s first direct presidential election in 2004, NU higher-ups like Hasyim Muzadi and Salahuddin Wahid have contested as vice presidential candidates. Most not too long ago, Jokowi’s victory in the 2019 presidential election has broadly been credited to the collection of Ma’ruf Amin, a senior NU kyai (spiritual scholar) as his operating mate, which allowed him to reap the votes of nahdliyin.
Nevertheless, the declaration of the Anies–Muhaimin ticket introduced into mild present fissures throughout the nahdliyin neighborhood—over NU’s ideological orientation, its involvement in electoral politics and its relationship with PKB, and the function of Muhaimin inside its political and non secular milieu. Within the absence of the distinctive political situations that unified NU behind Jokowi and Ma’ruf Amin in 2019, the political function of NU and its followers within the 2024 elections would be the topic of intense contestation.
![](https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/375910055_830694181758671_8109786692725384032_n-1024x683.jpg)
Muhaimin Iskandar campaigning after his appointment as Anies Baswedan’s operating mate (Photograph: Muhaimin Iskandar Fb)
Factionalism and dissent inside NU
Ideological considerations have been on the forefront of many objections to Muhaimin’s partnership with Anies. Ever since Anies efficiently courted the assist of hardline Muslim teams throughout his ascendancy to the governorship of Jakarta in 2017, he has had a conservative picture which fits in opposition to the values of moderation, openness, and tolerance extremely esteemed by nahdliyin.
As such, Anies’ partnership with Muhaimin—somebody anticipated to epitomise and advocate NU values—has been seen as ideologically incompatible by some components of the nahdliyin. This isn’t to say that Anies can also be supported by the conservative PKS—which, with its roots within the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired tarbiyah motion, is ideologically totally different to NU. Therefore it isn’t stunning that there have been many nahdliyin who hoped that PKS would exit Anies’ coalition after the declaration, as Muhaimin himself admitted in a recent interview.
These ideological considerations come up within the context of a unbroken debate inside NU communities concerning the organisation’s political function and its relationship with PKB. On the grassroots stage, and particularly on social media, tensions surrounding Muhaimin’s nomination have been mirrored in a break up between those that oppose the nomination on the grounds of sustaining the “neutrality” of NU as a social organisation and those that consider that the political identification of PKB is inseparable from NU’s socio-ideological milieu.
These tensions surfaced instantly after kyai Yahya Cholil Staquf, the chairman of the chief management board of NU on the nationwide stage (PBNU), publicly warned any presidential candidate to not drag the organisation into pragmatic politics. Coming simply days after the announcement of the Anies–Muhaimin ticket, Yahya’s assertion was undoubtedly directed on the PKB chairman.
Responding to this public warning from Yahya, many pro-Muhaminin NU cadre and PKB members took to social media. The hashtag #SayaNUSayaPKB (“I’m NU subsequently I’m PKB”) has been broadly posted and tweeted to point out that NU and PKB are basically inseparable. Among the many proponents of this motion is the younger and influential kyai Imam Jazuli, as posted on PKB’s official Twitter channel.
![](https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Picture-2-765x1024.png)
PKB’s official Tweet on the inseparability of NU and PKB, citing kyai Imam Jazuli’s assertion
This grassroots discord is actually rooted in elite-level factionalism. At its coronary heart is the political rivalry between three fundamental NU factions: Muhaimin’s camp; the “Rembang” institution; and the loyalists of Abdurrahman Wahid (affectionately known as “Gus Dur”), the previous Indonesian president and one of many founders of PKB. The Rembang institution encompasses the PBNU chairman Yahya, and his youthful brother, Minister for Spiritual Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, together with different kyai and NU functionaries below their patronage. These two names hail from a well-respected line of NU figures and pesantren institutions with roots in Rembang, Central Java.
![](https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/336913140_565736442316066_5373520426999382613_n-1024x682.jpg)
Minister for Spiritual Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas (left) and his elder brother, PBNU Chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf, converse to the media after a gathering with President Joko Widodo, March 2023 (Photograph: Setkab RI Fb)
Not surprisingly, quickly after the Anies–Muhaimin declaration and the pair’s public appearances within the media, Minister Yaqut gave an announcement that went additional than his elder brother’s, interesting for voters to not endorse a candidate who had created and brought benefit of socio-religious polarisation for political purposes. There isn’t a doubt that this assertion was directed at Anies, or that it was seemingly meant to additional stir up ideological pressure between NU supporters and conservative components, thus placing Muhaimin at an obstacle.
The rivalry between Muhaimin’s group and the Rembang institution revolves across the 2021 PBNU Muktamar, or congress, at which Yahya was elected chairman, defeating two-term incumbent Stated Aqil Siroj, who is understood to be very near Muhaimin. The emergence of Yahya as the brand new Chairman meant the discount—if not the outright disappearance—of Muhaimin’s political clout in PBNU.
Nahdlatul Ulama and the politics trap
A pillar of Indonesian civil society faces an ever extra acute dilemma between representing a non secular neighborhood and securing sources and affect inside authorities.
Within the wake of Yahya and Yaqut’s veiled criticisms of Muhaimin’s assist for Anies, Stated Aqil lent assist to Muhaimin, stating that PKB was born from the womb of NU itself, therefore their inseparability. He additionally publicly sympathised with Muhaimin when the Corruption Eradication Fee (KPK) all of the sudden revived an investigation into Muhaimin that had been dormant for greater than a decade, alluding to the potential for a politically-charged investigation. Whereas Stated Aqil has not but formally endorsed Muhaimin’s candidacy publicly, he’s reported to have requested his loyalists to support whichever political coalition features Muhaimin.
In the meantime, pressure between Muhaimin’s camp and the sympathisers of former president Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, stems from the unresolved quarrel over the transition of PKB’s management from Gus Dur’s camp to Muhaimin circa 2008, when each side claimed rightful management over the celebration. Muhaimin emerged because the victor within the authorized battles that ensued, gaining official command over the celebration organisation.
It’s no secret that Gus Dur’s household and loyalists nonetheless maintain a grudge in opposition to Muhaimin. This resurfaced publicly after Muhaimin acknowledged in a television interview that he didn’t mastermind a coup in opposition to Gus Dur, however somewhat that he was the sufferer of the coup. His assertion instantly invited derision from the ex-president’s daughters. Allisa Wahid accused Muhaimin of spreading false info and demanded that he apologise and never use Gus Dur in any approach for his personal political achieve. In the meantime, Yenny Wahid— whose identify has been circulating in polls as potential vice-presidential candidates—has additionally repeatedly questioned Muhaimin’s loyalty, decency, and ethical character, particularly in mild of his history of conflict with Gus Dur.
![](https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Picture-1-1.png)
Allisa Wahid’s tweet criticising Muhaimin
Robust race in East Java’s electoral battleground
With assaults coming at Muhaimin from all sides, and factionalism and elite rivalries plaguing the NU institution, the PKB chairman is dealing with a state of affairs that’s essentially totally different to the 2019 election, when NU unequivocally threw its assist behind one man, Ma’ruf Amin, as Jokowi’s operating mate.
The situation that facilitated a larger unity inside NU again then—the existence of an exterior risk of conservative Islamic components—is not current at this time as a result of relative success of Jokowi’s systematic, albeit draconian, antiradicalism policy. Muhaimin’s hopes appear to relaxation on consolidating the assist of grassroots NU santri (college students of pesantren) and sympathisers by means of the patronage of native kyai.
Fortuitously for Muhaimin, he nonetheless instructions a substantial amount of assist from charismatic NU leaders who’re obsessed with his candidacy. Aside from the so-called “Cirebon clique”, which incorporates Stated Aqil Siroj and Imam Jazuli, Muhaimin can anticipate assist for his candidacy from notable names in East Java. Chief amongst them could be kyai Kholil As’advert of Situbondo, whom Muhaimin has repeatedly claimed has given him a mandate to be Anies’ operating mate. Former vice chairman of NU’s East Java provincial management board (PWNU), kyai Abdussalam Shohib of Jombang—who was not too long ago abruptly dismissed from his place by Yahya’s PBNU—additionally stands able to assist Muhaimin, as do numerous different senior and junior kyai similar to Abdurrahman Al Kautsar of Kediri.
It has been broadly assumed that Anies’ alternative of Muhaimin was underpinned by the logic of ameliorating his lacklustre polling efficiency in East Java. Certainly, East Java shall be a central battleground within the upcoming 2024 election, simply as in earlier presidential elections, for its politico-cultural significance as a nahdliyin stronghold and due to the variety of eligible voters there: more than 31 million, the second highest after West Java’s 35 million. Undoubtedly, Muhaimin’s assist amongst kyai in East Java will show essential in tilting voters’ favour in the direction of Anies’ camp.
Nevertheless, it shall be famous that PKB didn’t rating a sizeable majority over the votes in East Java within the 2019 election, acquiring round the same percentage of votes—about 19%—as PDI-P, now the political automobile of Ganjar Pranowo. Partai Demokrat, which has been gravely upset by Anies’ alternative of Muhaimin, nonetheless holds some affect in East Java and won’t seemingly enable clean crusing for Anies. Equally, Prabowo Subianto’s coalition events Gerindra and Golkar alone received a combined vote of 21% in East Java. When taking account of the disgruntled sympathisers of Gus Dur within the province as properly, Anies and Muhaimin shall anticipate a really robust battle forward.
![](https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/376687832_864682285014790_712712690617869950_n-1024x682.jpg)
Anies Baswedan at a PKS marketing campaign occasion in Palembang, September 2023 (Photograph: Anies Baswedan Fb)
With the absence of an exterior risk to bind NU collectively, the important thing to profitable the assist of nahdliyin in East Java might lie in three areas. Initially, any candidate must possess in-depth information of NU’s inside dynamics, subtleties, and context to have the ability to use the rivalries of various factions to his benefit. As proven above, inside frictions inside NU are actual, and may considerably tilt the stability of the 2024 election.
Second, profitable over assist in a decent electoral battleground as East Java requires important funding of fabric sources as patronage since voters want greater materials incentives to be swayed. The race could also be marked by what Edward Aspinall has called “patchwork politics”, the place candidates combat lengthy and laborious over small plots of native constituencies (e.g. villages or pesantren) over time to win votes. The outcomes of this technique are sometimes decided by the efficient concentrating on of patronage to voters (and guaranteeing their reciprocity within the type of votes) by means of elaborate and systematic networks of brokerage. Native kyai and their networks, who possess granular insights into voters’ behaviour, usually develop into influential gamers in such settings.
And at last, on condition that one can’t deal with East Java as a homogenised political constituency, the assist of different distinguished NU figures within the area past the warring factions—such because the incumbent governor, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, or Mahfud MD, a senior minister in Jokowi’s administration—might show essential. It’s broadly agreed that Khofifah holds sway over the female cadre of NU in East Java, whereas Mahfud MD may maintain the important thing to profitable the votes of Madurese nadhliyin—who usually exhibit different voting patterns than their mainland Java counterparts, because the earlier elections have proven.
All in all, Anies and Muhaimin will face a rocky street forward of the 2024 elections. The truth that they declared their ticket early offers a bonus to evaluate and cope with believable obstacles earlier than the official formal registration of candidates on the electoral fee. But, it additionally makes them weak to countermoves and manoeuvrings by anybody wishing to deal with their candidacy.