As described in my first post on this collection, Randall Holcombe’s new e book Following Their Leaders: Political Preferences and Public Policy was written to look at how political preferences are shaped. To begin, Holcombe separates preferences into two totally different classes – expressive preferences, and instrumental preferences. Expressive preferences are, because the title suggests, what we want to specific. On this case, “specific” isn’t restricted to what we talk verbally or in writing, although it does embody these. One thing is “expressive” when its objective isn’t to result in some consequence, however to replicate a selected angle. Bumper stickers, yard indicators, and tweets are all expressive, however modes of habits meant to function a “present of help” are expressive acts. Instrumental preferences, against this, are in regards to the outcomes we want.
![](https://www.econlib.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/51B0T6t5QBL._SX439_BO1204203200_-204x300.jpg)
Our instrumental preferences might or might not align with our expressive preferences. Instrumentally, we’d want A over B, however we’d additionally want to specific help for B over A. Take into account the case of somebody who expresses robust help for the concept of procuring at small and native companies, however when it’s time to do their procuring will drive proper previous all of the native mother and pop retailers and make their strategy to Goal. Their expressive desire is for native procuring and small enterprise, however their instrumental desire is for giant field retail shops.
There are a lot of the reason why our expressive preferences might not align with our instrumental preferences. Some preferences really feel extra virtuous to specific – it simply feels higher to specific help for small native companies than for large retail companies. Or our expressive preferences might be shaped by peer strain – you may obtain social opprobrium when you outwardly specific that massive field retailers are a greater deal than native retailers. Whether or not we go along with our expressive or instrumental preferences can be context dependent, notably in relation to market exercise and political exercise:
When participating in market exercise, folks have an incentive to decide on the outcomes they most want, as a result of they get what they select. There is no such thing as a such incentive when folks vote. As a result of their political decisions haven’t any impact on political outcomes, folks might specific political preferences for outcomes they might not select if the alternatives have been theirs alone.
Furthermore, we shouldn’t underestimate the significance folks place on satisfying their expressive preferences:
As soon as folks’s fundamental wants for meals, clothes, and shelter are glad, their demand for extra items and companies is pushed largely by expressive issues. Their want for standing, to impress others, and to be ok with themselves may even overshadow their want for requirements. Individuals will surrender meals to spend cash for expressive functions.
When our expressive preferences don’t align with our instrumental preferences, and when fulfilling our expressive preferences comes with no instrumental value, we might count on folks to indulge of their expressive preferences. That is why somebody may put up yard indicators on the significance of supporting native enterprise, and nod sagely together with their pals who specific the identical thought, but nonetheless drive to Goal when it comes time to do their procuring. Within the former instances, the expressive desire is affordable, however within the latter case, fulfilling that desire is expensive.
When appearing as voters, Holcombe argues, expressive preferences will win the day. Not like in markets, the place the direct hyperlink between what we select and what we obtain makes us more likely to favor our instrumental preferences over our expressive preferences, the dearth of any such robust hyperlink makes participating in voting or different political exercise more likely to be pushed by our expressive preferences over our instrumental preferences:
[Voters] are appearing expressively, not instrumentally, and as people they don’t seem to be selecting an end result, they’re expressing a desire. There are a lot of causes to assume that the preferences they specific on the poll field might differ from outcomes they would favor if the selection amongst social alternate options have been really theirs to make.
This may clarify why voters might vote for a selected end result, however in observe present little no concern about whether or not that end result is efficiently achieved. For instance, close to welfare and switch packages, Holcombe factors out that:
…most authorities redistribution doesn’t go to the least well-off. It’s focused to college students, to farmers, and to the aged with out regard to their financial standing…People who find themselves voting for redistribution are, largely, not voting to assist the needy, however voting to assist the politically well-connected. The poor have comparatively little political clout in contrast with the aged, the training institution, and even supporters of the humanities.
This appears odd. If voters actually cared about supporting the needy, and if redistribution in observe doesn’t make the needy a lot of a precedence, why does this state of affairs live on for many years, with out a widespread demand for change from voters? As a result of casting votes is an expressive act, not an instrumental act, and attaining a particular end result wasn’t the purpose of the train to any given voter:
By casting a charitable vote, voters can get an excellent feeling about doing one thing to assist the much less lucky, however at no private value to themselves. They be ok with expressing charitable views with out having to surrender something, as a result of voting is a nonlogical motion. Voters may vote for presidency redistribution packages as expressive acts, although if the choice have been theirs alone, they might select to not fund these packages. Individuals, as voters, can specific help for packages and candidates they might not select if the alternatives have been theirs alone.
The disconnect between the widespread justification for redistribution (serving to the needy) and the precise end result of redistribution (serving to the politically highly effective) is essentially unnoticed by voters as a result of the voters weren’t searching for to create an instrumental end result to start with. The purpose was merely to specific a desire for serving to the needy – whether or not or not the needy really obtain assist consequently was by no means actually the purpose.
The distinction between expressive and instrumental preferences presents one other drawback. Recall within the first put up the place I described Holcombe’s method for the way democracy works – votes are forged to indicate voter preferences, the votes are aggregated, and a collective alternative is made. The interior elements of that course of, P1 to Pn, are implicitly assumed by political scientists to be instrumental preferences – voters reflecting the outcomes they like. But when voters are appearing expressively slightly than instrumentally, then the output of the voting course of doesn’t present any actual details about what outcomes voters really need:
If folks don’t reveal their instrumental preferences once they vote, there is no such thing as a strategy to relate mixture outcomes of elections again to the underlying preferences of voters for precise outcomes. One can’t determine the diploma to which social decisions replicate the instrumental preferences of voters, as a result of the social alternative mechanisms being analyzed don’t mixture instrumental preferences; they mixture expressive preferences.
Thus, voting mechanisms may solely present perception about voters’ preferences for outcomes if voters’ instrumental preferences have been an identical to their expressive preferences. If voters’ instrumental and expressive preferences aren’t an identical, nonetheless, then even when it was doable to completely mixture votes in a socially optimum approach (which it isn’t) and even when policymakers have been fully incorruptible seraphim completely motivated to faithfully serve the general public (which they aren’t), elections would nonetheless fail to ship the outcomes the general public needs.
Nonetheless, this disconnect between expressive and instrumental preferences nonetheless doesn’t get to the core of Holcombe’s evaluation. Within the subsequent put up, I’ll describe one other approach of taking a look at preferences he identifies, and the way this influences the way in which folks kind their political views.
As described in my first post on this collection, Randall Holcombe’s new e book Following Their Leaders: Political Preferences and Public Policy was written to look at how political preferences are shaped. To begin, Holcombe separates preferences into two totally different classes – expressive preferences, and instrumental preferences. Expressive preferences are, because the title suggests, what we want to specific. On this case, “specific” isn’t restricted to what we talk verbally or in writing, although it does embody these. One thing is “expressive” when its objective isn’t to result in some consequence, however to replicate a selected angle. Bumper stickers, yard indicators, and tweets are all expressive, however modes of habits meant to function a “present of help” are expressive acts. Instrumental preferences, against this, are in regards to the outcomes we want.
![](https://www.econlib.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/51B0T6t5QBL._SX439_BO1204203200_-204x300.jpg)
Our instrumental preferences might or might not align with our expressive preferences. Instrumentally, we’d want A over B, however we’d additionally want to specific help for B over A. Take into account the case of somebody who expresses robust help for the concept of procuring at small and native companies, however when it’s time to do their procuring will drive proper previous all of the native mother and pop retailers and make their strategy to Goal. Their expressive desire is for native procuring and small enterprise, however their instrumental desire is for giant field retail shops.
There are a lot of the reason why our expressive preferences might not align with our instrumental preferences. Some preferences really feel extra virtuous to specific – it simply feels higher to specific help for small native companies than for large retail companies. Or our expressive preferences might be shaped by peer strain – you may obtain social opprobrium when you outwardly specific that massive field retailers are a greater deal than native retailers. Whether or not we go along with our expressive or instrumental preferences can be context dependent, notably in relation to market exercise and political exercise:
When participating in market exercise, folks have an incentive to decide on the outcomes they most want, as a result of they get what they select. There is no such thing as a such incentive when folks vote. As a result of their political decisions haven’t any impact on political outcomes, folks might specific political preferences for outcomes they might not select if the alternatives have been theirs alone.
Furthermore, we shouldn’t underestimate the significance folks place on satisfying their expressive preferences:
As soon as folks’s fundamental wants for meals, clothes, and shelter are glad, their demand for extra items and companies is pushed largely by expressive issues. Their want for standing, to impress others, and to be ok with themselves may even overshadow their want for requirements. Individuals will surrender meals to spend cash for expressive functions.
When our expressive preferences don’t align with our instrumental preferences, and when fulfilling our expressive preferences comes with no instrumental value, we might count on folks to indulge of their expressive preferences. That is why somebody may put up yard indicators on the significance of supporting native enterprise, and nod sagely together with their pals who specific the identical thought, but nonetheless drive to Goal when it comes time to do their procuring. Within the former instances, the expressive desire is affordable, however within the latter case, fulfilling that desire is expensive.
When appearing as voters, Holcombe argues, expressive preferences will win the day. Not like in markets, the place the direct hyperlink between what we select and what we obtain makes us more likely to favor our instrumental preferences over our expressive preferences, the dearth of any such robust hyperlink makes participating in voting or different political exercise more likely to be pushed by our expressive preferences over our instrumental preferences:
[Voters] are appearing expressively, not instrumentally, and as people they don’t seem to be selecting an end result, they’re expressing a desire. There are a lot of causes to assume that the preferences they specific on the poll field might differ from outcomes they would favor if the selection amongst social alternate options have been really theirs to make.
This may clarify why voters might vote for a selected end result, however in observe present little no concern about whether or not that end result is efficiently achieved. For instance, close to welfare and switch packages, Holcombe factors out that:
…most authorities redistribution doesn’t go to the least well-off. It’s focused to college students, to farmers, and to the aged with out regard to their financial standing…People who find themselves voting for redistribution are, largely, not voting to assist the needy, however voting to assist the politically well-connected. The poor have comparatively little political clout in contrast with the aged, the training institution, and even supporters of the humanities.
This appears odd. If voters actually cared about supporting the needy, and if redistribution in observe doesn’t make the needy a lot of a precedence, why does this state of affairs live on for many years, with out a widespread demand for change from voters? As a result of casting votes is an expressive act, not an instrumental act, and attaining a particular end result wasn’t the purpose of the train to any given voter:
By casting a charitable vote, voters can get an excellent feeling about doing one thing to assist the much less lucky, however at no private value to themselves. They be ok with expressing charitable views with out having to surrender something, as a result of voting is a nonlogical motion. Voters may vote for presidency redistribution packages as expressive acts, although if the choice have been theirs alone, they might select to not fund these packages. Individuals, as voters, can specific help for packages and candidates they might not select if the alternatives have been theirs alone.
The disconnect between the widespread justification for redistribution (serving to the needy) and the precise end result of redistribution (serving to the politically highly effective) is essentially unnoticed by voters as a result of the voters weren’t searching for to create an instrumental end result to start with. The purpose was merely to specific a desire for serving to the needy – whether or not or not the needy really obtain assist consequently was by no means actually the purpose.
The distinction between expressive and instrumental preferences presents one other drawback. Recall within the first put up the place I described Holcombe’s method for the way democracy works – votes are forged to indicate voter preferences, the votes are aggregated, and a collective alternative is made. The interior elements of that course of, P1 to Pn, are implicitly assumed by political scientists to be instrumental preferences – voters reflecting the outcomes they like. But when voters are appearing expressively slightly than instrumentally, then the output of the voting course of doesn’t present any actual details about what outcomes voters really need:
If folks don’t reveal their instrumental preferences once they vote, there is no such thing as a strategy to relate mixture outcomes of elections again to the underlying preferences of voters for precise outcomes. One can’t determine the diploma to which social decisions replicate the instrumental preferences of voters, as a result of the social alternative mechanisms being analyzed don’t mixture instrumental preferences; they mixture expressive preferences.
Thus, voting mechanisms may solely present perception about voters’ preferences for outcomes if voters’ instrumental preferences have been an identical to their expressive preferences. If voters’ instrumental and expressive preferences aren’t an identical, nonetheless, then even when it was doable to completely mixture votes in a socially optimum approach (which it isn’t) and even when policymakers have been fully incorruptible seraphim completely motivated to faithfully serve the general public (which they aren’t), elections would nonetheless fail to ship the outcomes the general public needs.
Nonetheless, this disconnect between expressive and instrumental preferences nonetheless doesn’t get to the core of Holcombe’s evaluation. Within the subsequent put up, I’ll describe one other approach of taking a look at preferences he identifies, and the way this influences the way in which folks kind their political views.