Editor’s be aware: this text initially appeared at Asialink Insights and is republished with permission.
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It was a Malaysian election like no different. After voters elected the primary hung parliament in Malaysia’s historical past on 19 November, it took nearly every week of tense negotiations to kind a coalition authorities capable of command a ruling bloc of 112 seats within the new 222-seat Dewan Raykat.
Anwar Ibrahim, the perennial aspirant to the prime minister’s workplace, lastly obtained the prize he had lengthy sought. Having consulted together with his brother sultans within the Council of Rulers on Thursday morning, the Agong or King, Sultan Abdullah of Pahang, introduced that Anwar would grow to be prime minster. Anwar was formally put in by sundown.
The challenges going through Anwar and his authorities are immense. Not least of these challenges is how he and it handle the offers underpinning the brand new PM’s ascendency and the legacy for Malaysian politics left by a singular election final result.
The election has modified the Malaysian political panorama in varied methods. Till the 14th common election (GE14) in 2018, the query of who would govern might at all times be answered prematurely; solely the exact numbers needed to be stuffed in on voting day. The Malay-based Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, led by the United Malays Nationwide Organisation (UMNO), would command a lot of the center floor and win; opposition can be divided between the poles of the largely Malay-based, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), and the largely non-Malay-supported social democratic Democratic Motion Occasion (DAP).
In 2018, there was some change. A naked majority was received, and held good in authorities for 2 years, by a mixture of the DAP and two events that had damaged out from UMNO, Anwar’s Individuals’s Justice Occasion (PKR) and Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s Bersatu (the Malaysian United Indigenous Occasion, higher rendered because the “Blood-and-Soil Malay Nationalists”).
In 2022, GE15 yielded one thing solely totally different: a three-way cut up, providing no clear and even potential parliamentary majority. A division by which the lengthy dominant participant, UMNO–BN, grew to become the smallest, the weakest, and essentially the most internally divided.
The smaller gamers apart, the numbers in parliament cut up 3 ways: between the UMNO–BN; the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition of PKR and the DAP; and the brand new Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition of PAS and Bersatu.
Malaysia’s new struggle over state power
The UMNO period is over, however its political financial system mannequin and the social conflicts it created nonetheless set the phrases of the brand new politics.
Notably, since GE14, Bersatu has modified each its chief and its political affiliation. Bersatu had been fashioned earlier than the 2018 elections as Dr Mahathir’s instrument to assist carry down his outdated social gathering, UMNO, in live performance with PH, which mixed Anwar’s largely Malay-based, however multiculturalist, PKR and the doctrinally multiculturalist and secularist DAP.
However this PH–Bersatu authorities, by which the then 92-year-old Dr Mahathir reprised his function as prime minister, was introduced down in 2020 by defections from each PKR and Bersatu. These defections had been led by Bersatu’s Muhyiddin Yassin, who grew to become its chief and PM following royal intervention. Muhyiddin, who survived as PM for simply 18 months, then led Bersatu into partnership for GE15 in 2022 with PAS within the Bersatu-fronted, however PAS-driven, PN coalition.
Some indication of the nice change since GE14 in 2018 is supplied by the naked numbers. PH fell from 113 home seats to 82; inside it, DAP largely held on, dropping from 42 to 40, PKR fell from 47 to 31, with smaller events making up the remaining; BN fell from 79 to 30, and in it UMNO from 54 to 26; whereas the brand new PN consortium received 73 seats, with Bersatu climbing from 13 to 30, the Islamist PAS from 18 to 41, and two non-party members making up the entire.
By final Thursday, not one of the three important coalitions had discovered the numbers to control, both by recruiting native events from Sarawak and Sabah or help from one another. PN refused to work with PH due to its mistrust of each Anwar and the so-called Chinese language ambitions of the DAP, whereas a a lot diminished and really divided UMNO struggled with the thought of working with both PN or PH.
Enter the Agong. When it appeared that no coalition was about to muster a governing bloc, the Agong stepped up stress for a unity authorities. With Muhyiddin firmly rejecting a proposal for his PAS-backed PN coalition to work with PH, in a means that struck many as impolite to the Agong, quiet and detailed negotiations between Anwar’s PH and key figures within the once-dominant however now humiliated UMNO–BN workforce had been paying off.
One other issue then got here into play. The election outcomes had been an enormous advance for the Islamists of PAS. They knew it, they usually confirmed that they knew it. Enthusiastically. However to fairly widespread disquiet, and never solely on the public degree. There has at all times been a deep underlying pressure between the Malay royal households and the Islamist political forces. Constitutionally and by revered custom, the Malay sultans or rulers are the heads of Islam of their states. They usually prefer it that means. They’re disinclined to share their prerogatives of spiritual management with those that could reply to different forces. In addition they are cautious of the doable route of Islamist zeal towards their very own place, privileges, and opulent way of life. Royal seigneurial Islam and clerically pushed well-liked rebel Islam have by no means lived simply collectively within the Malay world.
When the Agong noticed the potential of an entente between Anwar’s PH and the chastened UMNO–BN group, from whose entrance line some failed leaders and people in authorized jeopardy had been prepared to face apart, he secured the assent of the opposite sultans within the Council of Rulers. Shocked by the extent of the collapse of UMNO with whom they’ve at all times labored and recognized intently, the sultans appear to have recognised that they need to not let any dislike of Anwar and their disinclination to have something to do with him outweigh their fairly fast and real fears that they’d be politically bereft with out UMNO at their aspect. When Muhyiddin sunk the Agong’s first “unity authorities” plan, they needed to look elsewhere. And as soon as Anwar and the much less controversial workplace holders in UMNO struck a deal, the royals quickly endorsed it.
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Anwar Ibrahim is sworn in as prime minister on the Istana Negara on 24 November 2022. (Picture: @istana_negara on Instagram)
However the ramifications of the election consequence are prone to endure and current a problem to Anwar’s premiership. The election vote was greater than a powerful repudiation of the ineptitude of the UMNO–BN authorities that in 2021 changed the Muhyiddin administration. It was greater than merely a rejection of UMNO corruption, highlighted by high-profile court docket circumstances centred on main UMNO ministers and personalities related to former PM Najib Razak. It additionally was greater than a harsh verdict on the unrelenting selfishness of all the principle Malay politicians—these veterans of UMNO who had struggled incessantly over a few years for place and benefit, whereas being seemingly deaf to well-liked issues, earlier than, after and through the COVID pandemic.
This Malay political conflict of all towards all signified, and was the consequence of, one thing deeper. It mirrored the truth that the rise of the brand new doctrine of Malay ascendancy—of “Ketuanan Melayu”—has over the previous 20 years sidelined, and intimidated into silence, different types of political pondering and motion. After efficiently excluding non-Malays from political energy, the Malay ethno-supremacists had no one left to combat with besides themselves. All the time the core of nationwide politics, Malay politics declined into incoherence, “warlordism” and factional retribution.
This was not one thing that many citizens had been ready to simply accept, particularly Malay voters who had been, mockingly, the target market. However how would they specific their rejection, politically? That’s what GE15 put to the check.
And the solutions it gives are as exceptional as they’re, to many, sudden.
For the reason that election, supporters of the Islamist PAS have been emboldened within the pursuit of a long-nurtured view of Malaysia’s future as, finally, an Islamic state working upon the premise of and implementing Shari’ah regulation—or a sure clericalist understanding of its character and imperatives. PAS by no means succeeded in promoting its pitch to the Malay majority. However in PN, PAS teamed up with Bersatu to promote its wares. PN provided, and was a automobile to advertise, an finally PAS-congenial goal and PAS-directed final result—however with out PAS itself having to promote the product, with its personal controversial baggage.
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PAS President Abdul Hadi Wang on the marketing campaign path throughout GE15 (Picture: @abdulhadiawang on Twitter)
Many didn’t see this coming. Even those that foresaw it misjudged and underestimated the energy of the PAS-driven PN surge. Many cosmopolitan voters within the fashionable non-Malay areas had been disquieted by the tone and elegance of the PN marketing campaign, particularly after its election-eve indulgence in anti-Christian rhetoric, when Muhyiddin declared that Christians had been being utilized by Jews to divert the nation from its functions.
However for a lot of within the semi-urban and rural Malay heartlands, this was no drawback. They needed to repudiate UMNO, to show it a lesson. They usually needed a plausible protector of Malay pursuits—what UMNO at all times insisted it was. In doing so, they’ve positioned PAS and the Islamist mission usually within the strongest place they’ve ever held in post-independence Malaysia. PAS has now strengthened its affect on the political and nationwide lifetime of Malaysia—or not less than key components of it.
That is the Malaysia Anwar should govern. He will likely be on a brief leash inside his personal coalition and obliged to beat Muslim suspicions he’s anti-Islam and pro-Chinese language. However Anwar who, surprisingly, has now rescued his outdated adversary UMNO from what final week appeared like imminent collapse and disintegration has, for now, restored a measure of economically indispensable hope and optimism to Malaysian public life. And doubtlessly, some stability too.